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Abstract: 
Roma are actively engaged in a process of identity formation and transnational 
contentious collective action, using (and utilising) EU and European institutions to 
remedy longstanding grievances and a litany of state-sponsored abuses (inc. coercive 
sterilization, segregated schooling and social marginalization).  Empowered by their 
newly acquired European Union citizenship, and improved political station at the 
international, European and local level, Roma activists are working to ensure their 
citizenship is never again usurped (as has been the case historically). Judicial 
victories at the European level have helped both to strengthen Roma identity and 
legitimise their national character. This begs the question: Can a polycentric polity, in 
this case the EU, accommodate opposing conceptions of citizenship and nationality 
without undermining its intergovernmental foundation/character? 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
When the European Union (EU) became just that, a ‗Union‘ of sovereign states 
linked together by an elaborate albeit historically rooted corpus of law and 
directives, discussion and debate concerning European citizenship, human rights 
and minority group protection, turned from normative (i.e. hypothetical/theoretical) 
to empirical (i.e. substantive citizenship rights). Several treaties, namely Maastricht 
(1993), Amsterdam (1999) and now Lisbon (2009), clearly aim to underscore the 
intergovernmental nature of the EU by emphasising member-state sovereignty and 
consensus decision-making. At the same time, however, these same treaties 
suggest certain ideas and rights as universally European, applicable to all twenty-
seven member-states and the approximately 500 million Europeans living therein. 
It‘s often argued (see Moravscik 2003)  that these so-called European rights are 
little more than ‗recommendations‘ and/or ‗non-binding rules‘, bearing supposedly 
no real influence on politics or political discourse, and requiring little from 
member-states in terms of delivery and implementation. Nevertheless, and perhaps 
remarkably then, these soft targets are beginning to present disadvantaged 
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 Art.42: Any citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or having its 
registered office in a Member State, has a right of access to documents of the institutions, bodies, 
Europeans, in this case Roma, with real, tangible political opportunities, reason to 
mobilise, initiate claims, and challenge conventional orthodoxy – from the top 
down (in a roundabout way). By confirming political and civil rights, a 
participatory model of decision-making that involves EU citizens (and 
nongovernmental organizations), and Roma rights at all levels, the EU and other 
European institutions, such as the European Court of Human Rights and 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, are empowering perhaps the 
most disadvantaged group in post-communist Europe, Roma.      
 
What is perhaps most intriguing about European integration, in terms of its ability 
to influence political processes and discourse, is how it has been working to 
catalyse previously (or initially) disparate (even diasporic) peoples. Case in point, 
Roma, an ethnic group without a coherent pan-European identity are beginning to 
realise a more substantive identity as a nation within an evolving European polity – 
a polity discovering its own ideational order. Part of this involves the realization of 
European Union citizenship, an aspect of Maastricht (1993), and access to EU 
institutions, including the Ombudsperson, Commission and Parliament (see Lisbon 
Treaty and Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union), it provides.
2
 
Even though EU citizenship is deferential to national-state citizenship, in that one 
cannot be a citizen of the EU without first obtaining citizenship in a member-state, 
it does offer an additional set of enumerated civil and political rights. As the 
Lisbon Treaty clearly states, ―citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every 
person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. 
Citizenship of the Union shall be additional to and not replace national citizenship‖ 
(Art. 20.1). Before proceeding, I should state clearly, this paper is not so much 
concerned with the logistical side of EU citizenship, though important, as it is with 
how conceptions of citizenship and correlated political opportunities enhance 
group identity and spur political mobilization.  
 
With multiple venues, Europe is redefining the nature, scope and character of 
contentious collective action. Among other things, this means disgruntled 
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 Art.42: Any citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or having its 
registered office in a Member State, has a right of access to documents of the institutions, bodies, 
offices and agencies of the Union, whatever their medium; Art.43: Any citizen of the Union and 
any natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in a Member State has the right 
to refer to the European Ombudsman cases of maladministration in the activities of the 
institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the Union, with the exception of the Court of Justice of 
the European Union acting in its judicial role; Art. 44: Any citizen of the Union and any natural 
or legal person residing or having its registered office in a Member State has the right to petition 
the European Parliament (Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union). 
‗Europeans‘ are able to utilise European institutions, lobby European officials (and 
parliamentarians) and pressurise national lawmakers vis-à-vis European policy 
communities and minority rights networks. Citizenship at the European level is 
therefore an encouragement, inviting individuals and groups (NGOs. etc.) to 
recalibrate strategies and tactics for a highly disaggregated, fluid and ‗open‘ policy 
arena. EU citizenship confers rights; EU institutions offer politico-juridical redress. 
Soysal (2010) captures the fluidity and ideational dimension of this kind of post-
Westphalian citizenship:   
 
[the national citizenship model] is losing ground to a more universal model 
of membership, anchored in deterritorialised notions of persons‘ rights...[this 
new model] confers upon every person the right and duty of participation in 
the authority structures and public life of a polity regardless of their 
historical and cultural ties to that community.
3
 
Such a model, admittedly normative, is useful in understanding how Roma could 
develop supranational and pan-European identity without first achieving a full 
complement of rights at the national-state level. In fact, their inability to realise 
appropriate human rights at the national level makes the European route much 
more enticing, even rational. I will explore this idea in more detail below. 
However, it should also be said that even with EU rights, inasmuch as Roma 
(were) are accorded mobility and employment rights under the TEU and Lisbon 
(etc.), France, in particular, was able to forcibly expel Roma this past August. As it 
was reported at the time, ―France (…) insisted that the actions "fully conform with 
European rules and do not in any way affect the freedom of movement for EU 
citizens, as defined by treaties" (BBC 20 Aug. 2010). The Commission, however, 
pressurised France both to reconsider such deportations and also re-evaluate their 
policies relating to travellers. Persistent confusion over how EU citizenship works 
is certainly part of the problem. As reported, only 32% of respondents considered 
themselves well informed about their rights in relation to EU citizenship (Flash 
Eurobarometer 2010: 5). Along with a ‗democratic deficit‘ there appears also to be 
a ‗knowledge deficit‘ in that many Europeans are unaware of their new European 
rights and how these rights can be exercised. 
The unfortunate thing (of many unfortunate things) about France‘s ‗relocation‘ of 
Roma is how it (a) perpetuates a common stereotype of Roma, in that they are 
criminals and a draw on social services, and (b) promulgates a pattern of 
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maltreatment dating back hundreds of years (or longer). In response to France‘s 
deportation of Roma to Romania and Bulgaria, the director of the European Roma 
Rights Centre, Robert Kushen, said: 
Mass expulsions based on ethnicity violate European Union law (…) and the 
failure of France to do individual assessments of each case — as opposed to 
cursory examinations of papers by the police — also violates European 
Union rules (NY Times, 19 August 2010).  
 
The EU Commission did threaten Paris, as said, demanding Roma be accorded the 
same mobility and human rights as any EU citizen residing and/or working in 
France. In the end Paris agreed to institute a better screening programme that 
would ensure a more idiosyncratic approach to worker/residency verification (AP 
19 Oct. 2010).  
 
Again, one is left to wonder how EU citizenship can ameliorate more entrenched 
forms of racism directed at Roma and an enduring belief that Roma are a drain on 
social services and prone to criminality. The Roma problem, as it has often been 
characterised, is not easily solved. As well, European integration, and all it entails, 
has not produced the sort of panacea many had hoped for. As Fawn (2001) argues, 
―if one group of people seems today to be consistently verbally derided, subjected 
to physical abuse, social marginalization and even legal disenfranchisement in the 
post-communist space, it is them [Roma]‖ (1193). As a recognizable minority 
group (but not always) Roma in all parts of Europe continue to experience abuse. 
But as a heterogeneous and dispersed (and at the same time insular) group, Roma 
still lack the sort of national identity, and by extension political clout, needed to 
dismantle impediments to substantive societal change. And unlike the Scots or 
Welsh are without a delimited territory to call ‗their own.‘ The conditions may 
therefore be ripe for the development of a pan-European Romani nation.     
  
I am working from the premise that group identity formation is likely to occur after 
significant institutional and/or political change. This is similar to Gellner‘s notion 
that nationalism precedes nationhood, or as he wrote, ―it is nationalism that 
engenders nations, and not the other way round,‖ (Gellner 2006:54) In this way 
ethnic group identity formation is a response to outside influences and external 
(external to the group) pressures, and not something that would have occurred 
naturally from the inside out. This is a strange argument to make considering 
Roma experience institutionalised forms of racism in almost all European 
countries, with the most callous forms of Romaphobia occurring in post-
communist states, like the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The more EU institutions, 
Commissioners and spokespeople refer to Roma as a nation, the more likely a 
more coherent Romani identity will emerge. The process of group identify 
formation is a complex and complicated one, and this is especially true of Roma. 
As it stands research on Roma (Guy 2001), Romani political mobilization 
(Vermeersch 2007), and impact of European integration on Roma and other 
minority groups (McGarry and Keating 2006) is proliferating and considering 
questions similar to the ones being asked here.  
 
Theory 
 
Though not always explicit, much of the argument here is informed by social 
constructivist theory (SCT). The theory, popularised by Alexander Wendt 
(1992;1999), is well-placed to explain the ideational and normative dimensions of 
European integration and how citizenship can be reconceptualised inside what is, 
ostensibly, an intergovernmental organization. Ideas flow through a constellation 
of institutions and actors, are reinforced by a decision-making model that is very 
much uncoordinated (and non-traditional), and find expression in EU directives 
and statements concerning ‗best practice,‘ even when recommendations culminate 
in non-papers
4
. According to Alexander Wendt, 
 
Students of international politics have increasingly accepted two basic tenets 
of ―constructivism‖: (1) that the structures of human association are 
determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces, and (2) that 
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dispute (c. 2001) between EU member Austria and then candidate country, Czech Republic. 
There was some concern that non-nuclear (and anti-nuclear) Austria would block the Czech 
Republic‘s entry if Temelín NPS, 80 km from the Austrian border, went online. Because energy 
projection is outside EU competency, officials had to turn to several non-binding directives, most 
notably Council Resolutions 22 (1975) and 18 (1992), which together call for cooperation in the 
area of nuclear technology and safety. Council Resolution 18 (92/C 172/02) is noteworthy 
because it extends the non-binding regime to non-EU countries in Central Eastern Europe and 
the Republics of the former Soviet Union. Many of these countries, like the Czech Republic, are 
now full-fledged EU members. The European Council and Commission have been responsible 
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vertically and horizontally (cf. Rhodes 1997: 46; Jachtenfuchs 2001: 250) 
the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these 
shared ideas rather than given by nature (1999: 1). 
 
Turning to SCT for help explaining contentious collective action, identity 
formation, or even European integration itself, is not entirely remarkable (see Risse 
1999; Trondal 2001; Checkel 2001; Christiansen et al. 2001). This paper, however, 
is attempting to link together notions of governance, citizenship, and rights, which 
taken together are central to European political integration (and the construction of 
a European demos), with contentious collective action and mobilization. It is the 
presence of ‗soft power‘ at the supranational level, integrative processes, namely 
governance, and hybridity of decision-making that distinguishes the EU from other 
regimes and IGOs.   
 
This essay will proceed in two parts. The first section offers a short description of 
Roma, summarising their socio-economic position and some of the difficulties 
they, as a group, have historically encountered. This section also touches on 
nationalism and the notion of ethnic mobilization. The second part examines 
European citizenship and governance as two separate albeit connected 
developments that are changing the nature of Romani mobilization and contentious 
politics.  
 
II. ROMA 
 
Roma, a heterogeneous group numbering between12 – 15 million, have lived in all 
parts of Europe from around the 13
th
 – 14th century. Since their introduction into 
Europe from northern India, Roma have experienced the gamut of cruel and 
unusual treatment. More recently (i.e. 20
th
 century), Roma were forcibly relocated 
and murdered at the hands of Nazi forces, had their language and culture ‗taken 
from them‘ through assimilatory policy in communist Europe (and elsewhere), 
experienced forced sedentarism, and Romani women, were subject to state-
sponsored sterilization programmes. During Nazi occupation, Czechoslovakia‘s 
Romani population was nearly liquidated, with only five percent of the pre-war 
population surviving the devouring (or porajmos).
5
 Twenty-two years after the 
collapse of communism in Eastern Europe Roma are still struggling to find their 
way. 
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czech-roma.  
While many books, monographs and articles have been published on the topic of 
Romani political mobilization and Roma culture, (see Guy 2001; Barany 2006; 
Vermeersch 2007; etc.), there still seems great uncertainty with respect to some 
fundamental ‗facts‘ about Roma. These demographic hurdles are not easily 
jumped, as many ethnic Roma (to use an imprecise term) seem unwilling and/or 
unable to self-identify as Roma. In a recent interview with the International 
Business Times (2010), Nidhi Trehan argues, 
 
Identity politics plays a huge role in estimating Romani population figures. 
Generally, Romani activists play up the figures and governments play them 
down. Because of centuries of persecution, many Roma are loathe to reveal 
their identity, as it could be tantamount to social suicide, this holds true for 
many Roma who can 'pass' or assimilate (either because of lighter skin color 
[sic] or better education). Over generations, some Romani families have 
completely assimilated (IBT 8 Sept. 2010).  
  
Historically citizenship has been used to control Roma, monitor their movement, as 
justification for assimilatory policy, and as a way for the deportee to justify 
forcible relocation or renationalization. It has often been argued, and recent events 
in France and Italy seem supportive of the view, that Roma are from ‗somewhere 
else‘ and as a result don‘t normally qualify for residency and/or citizenship. This 
was certainly the case when Czechoslovakia split along federal lines, as many 
Roma living in the Czech half were effectively permitted from obtaining 
citizenship in the new Czech Republic. As many Roma living in the Czech lands 
were forced to relocate from Slovakia decades earlier, it seemed odd (and 
seemingly discriminatory) to demand proof of residency from Roma.  
 
Since the collapse of communism in 1989, and subsequent accession process that 
brought Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary into the EU fold, Roma have 
borne the brunt of transitional angst and anger. In many ways socio-economic 
conditions worsened for Central and Eastern European Roma with the introduction 
of liberal democracy and a market economy. Whereas under communism Roma 
were guaranteed employment, an apartment and subsistence income, post 
communism they have been left to languish in what amount to Roma ghettos, very 
often miles away from urban centres. As Pogány (2004) reports, ―hundreds of 
thousands of Roma, particularly in Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria and in parts of the 
former Yugoslavia, live in settlements with limited access to clean drinking water, 
sanitation or basic medical care‖ (p.1). Awareness of these problems does not seem 
to correlate with purposeful action on the part of lawmakers to ameliorate them. In 
this way democratization has not been entirely enabling for Roma. But this is only 
half the story. As Kymlicka (2005) argues, ―since 1989 we [sic] have witnessed a 
remarkable trend toward the internationalization of minority rights issues in the 
European context‖ (p.191). Is it therefore only a matter of time until Roma realise 
their full ‗ethnic‘ potential?  
 
Under normal circumstances a coherent Romani lobby would have emerged 
immediately after the collapse of communism in Central Europe and remained 
active throughout the accession process. In other jurisdictions ethnic mobilization, 
collective action, and even single issue political parties have become 
commonplace. Thus far Central European Roma have been unable to sustain mass-
based political parties. Other than very limited success immediately after the 
transition, Romani political groups remain disparate and ineffectual (Ringold et al. 
2005). There is a paradox at play here however, which Zoltan Barany expresses 
succinctly below below: 
 
Given that in several East European states the Roma comprise a 
substantial percentage of the overall population (Bulgaria 8.5, Hungary4.7, 
Romania 6.6, and Slovakia 9.5), one would expect that they, like other 
minority groups, would have gained a proportionate political presence once 
they were granted the opportunity to mobilize. This did not happen (2002: 
278) 
 
Ethnic mobilization, understood here as ―the process by which groups organize 
around some feature of ethnic identity (for example, skin colour, language, 
custom) in pursuit of collective ends‖ (Olzak 1983: 355) is one form of political 
mobilization. Peter Vermeersch, Zoltan Barany and István Pogány have written 
very good accounts of Romani mobilization in post-communist Europe and tend to 
agree that Romani mobilization is far from a sure thing, perhaps even unlikely. 
There are at least two countervailing forces at play: first, independent Roma groups 
have been co-opted by large international (or European) NGOs, thus stifling 
grassroots political initiatives; second, the sheer complexity of the post-accession 
political environment coupled with the diasporic quality of Roma generally, means 
seldom do uniform movements emerge, and seldom are they able to speak for the 
whole of the Romani nation. 
 
Before formal accession negotiations had even begun the EU Commission was 
already voicing concern over the maltreatment of Central European Roma, and had 
singled the Czech Republic and Slovakia out as persistent violators of Roma 
human rights. In 1999 the EU was already pledging to support, ―both financially 
and politically, social programmes aimed at improving the situation of the Roma 
minority in the Czech Republic‖ (AP 11 Nov. 1999). A year earlier in 1998 the EU 
was confronted with a clear-cut case of racism in a potential candidate country, the 
Czech Republic. In Usti nad Labem and Plzen the town council approved the 
building of a ‗separation wall,‘ which would have in effect ghettoized the Roma 
population. This controversial project drew criticism from national Roma 
associations, international human rights groups and, the EU, which suggested the 
Czech Republic‘s membership bid would be harmed if this segregation were 
permitted to continue (BBC 21 Nov 1999).  As the BBC reported in 1999, ―the 
gypsies of Usti Nad Labem believe what can help them now is the Czech 
Republic's eagerness for membership of the European Union….As the accession 
talks continue, the diplomatic pressure is growing on Prague to improve its record 
on human rights‖ (BBC 26 Feb 1999). With central government‘s prompting (and 
financial assistance) the wall separating the Roma from the non-Roma was 
eventually torn down and, five years later, the Czech Republic joined the EU. The 
Commission stipulates the following.   
 
The European institutions and Member States have a joint responsibility to 
improve the social inclusion of Roma by using all the instruments and 
policies for which they have the respective competence (...) The European 
Union has a strong legal framework to combat Roma discrimination, based 
among others, on article 13 of the Treaty of the European Community 
and the Directive 2000/43/EC on racial equality. Member States have the 
duty to translate the Directive into their own national legislations (European 
Commission)
6
 
 
Citizenship woes 
 
This paper is discussing EU citizenship as it relates to Roma. Perhaps this is 
premature given many Roma are without the full complement of citizenship rights 
at the national level, and are still facing dire living conditions in many parts of 
Europe. When Czechoslovakia separated into the Czech Republic and Slovakia, 
respectively, at midnight on 31 December 1993, many Roma were ipso facto 
without nationality/citizenship. As a result of complicated and onerous citizenship 
requirements, i.e. five years of unbroken residency, many Roma were unable to 
gain citizenship in the new Czech Republic. They were, for all intents and 
purposes, aliens in their own country, losing political rights and access to 
education, healthcare and consular services. Siklova and Mikluskova (1998) 
suggest this new regime was intentionally cumbersome. 
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 A confidential document had been prepared in the fall of 1992 by the Czech 
government, analysing in advance necessary legal step and legislation that 
would be needed in the event of a division of Czechoslovakia. At that time, 
and exodus of Roma from Slovakia was anticipated 
 
The idea of citizenship, and not to be arbitrarily deprived of it, is integral to the 
modern state system. Richard Bellamy (2008) frames it according to ‗the right to 
have rights.‘ This is very instructive and especially relevant in the context of 
European integration because the Charter of Fundament Rights of the European 
Union underscores the ‗right to have rights,‘ as it relates member-states, and it also 
works to elevate such rights, even minority rights, to the supranational level.  
 
Nationalism 
 
Ethnic nationalism is seldom championed. Construed as the root cause of civil war, 
violence, and intolerant political movements, it normally doesn‘t fit well with a 
discussion of political integration, cultural diffusion and institutional 
isomorphism.
7
 Orwell argues,   
 
By ‗nationalism‘ I mean first of all the habit of assuming that human beings 
can be classified like insects and that whole blocks of millions or tens of 
millions of people can be confidently labelled ‗good‘ or ‗bad‘(...) But 
secondly — and this is much more important — I mean the habit of 
identifying oneself with a single nation or other unit, placing it beyond good 
and evil and recognising no other duty than that of advancing its interests.8 
 
Ethnic nationalism garnered much attention during the break-up of Yugoslavia, as 
the wars clearly demonstrated that religion, ethnicity and culture, if used to 
promote hate, can become caustic. However, notions of ethnic nationalism were 
also applied (and used heuristically) to the separation of Czechoslovakia (1993) 
and to the devolution programme (1999) in the United Kingdom, which saw power 
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reassigned from Westminster to new legislatures in Scotland and Wales. While 
negative connotations abound, ethnic or cultural nationalism should not 
exclusively be thought of as a destructive or dangerous. In many ways nationalism 
is a precursor to effective ethnic mobilization, especially amongst socio-
economically and/or socio-politically weak constituencies that historically have 
lacked a static identity.    
 
III. EUROPEAN CITIZENSHIP AND GOVERNANCE 
At its core the EU is about politico-economic integration, cooperation and 
harmonization. Immediately after WWII, France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux 
countries began considering post-war settlement, reconstruction, and development. 
It was decided the best way to proceed was vis-à-vis an intergovernmental 
arrangement couched in the language of democracy, justice and Europeanism. 
From the outset the European project oscillated between strict inter-
governmentalism, premised on inter-state negotiation, sovereign equality and 
consensus decision making, and supranationalism, which presented in the form of 
European institutions, Community directives, and ideational or normative networks 
(i.e. Europeanization). As Article 2 of the Treaty of Rome states,  
 
The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and 
progressively approximating the economic policies of Member States, to 
promote throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic 
activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an 
accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer relations between the 
States belonging to it (Treaty of Rome, 1957) 
 
A recent report on EU citizenship, discussing some of the problems associated with 
Europeanization and extension of rights to all member-states, provides a good 
summary of how EU citizenship is construed.  
 
The concept of citizenship of the European Union, introduced by the Treaty 
of Maastricht in 1992, added a new political dimension to the hitherto 
primarily economic nature of European integration. Every person holding 
the nationality of an EU Member State is now also automatically a citizen of 
the European Union. EU citizenship does not replace national citizenship. 
Instead, it confers upon all EU citizens an additional set of rights, 
guaranteed by the EU Treaties, which lie at the heart of their everyday lives 
(EU Report 2010:2)
9
 
 
The polycentric nature of post Maastricht Europe, replete with new and different 
loci/spheres of political power, judicial (and judicial-like) institutions and 
ideational frameworks, has significantly altered the nature and scope of contentious 
politics
10
. When the Czech Republic, for instance, acceded to the acquis 
communautaire in 2004, it was joining a polity with established transnational 
pathways, in both the policy and civil society spheres. The ways in which 
collective action and ultimately politics occur has changed in several profound 
ways. First, issue salience is the most important determinant of political action. 
Interest groups and NGOs seem unconstrained by political and/or geographic 
barriers and are more willing to support local campaigners and see benefit in 
collaborative enterprise
11
. Second, advocacy groups have multiple access points 
from which to enter and/or influence the policy process, and importantly are not 
beholden to ‗normal‘ lobbying techniques; money is also less important. 
Traditional forms of collective action, lobbying and protest have given way to non-
traditional forms, which are characteristically episodic, transnational and 
multidimensional. As Cram (1998) suggests ―the decision to embark on any form 
of collective action is, of course, made within the context of a set of opportunities 
facilitating collective action and of a set of constraints inhibiting the prospect of 
collaboration‖ (p.64). And third, an impressive corpus of European and 
international law has had an equalizing effect, as many member-states are entirely 
unsure about the nature and function of human rights law.    
 
The EU is a polity sui generis, and the NGOs, advocacy organizations and 
professional associations that inhabit this novel political space have in many 
circumstances been making up the rules of the political contestation game as they 
go. Roma are utilising EU institutions, European-level judicial bodies (i.e. 
European Court of Human Rights) and other European and non-European 
organizations, namely the United Nations and the Organization for Security and 
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 The notion of ideational framework refers to a cluster of ideas, norms, and even practices that 
impact politics and political action. An ideational framework constitutes a separate, albeit 
interconnected sphere, that shapes behavior and influences institutionalized politics. The ‗idea‘ 
of governance is just as important as the institutions of governance; the ‗idea‘ of advocacy is just 
as important as the institutions that enable it. 
11
 This is especially true of environmental mobilization. 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
12
, to advance grievances and ultimately change 
discriminatory policy and practice. Central to post accession Romani activism and 
repertoires of contention, then, is the notion of European governance, which offers 
groups institutional opportunities, new ideational framework and/or participant-
friendly political cultural, and ultimately a more extensive network of human rights 
NGOs and related policy communities.      
 
As a result of the EU Commission‘s 2001 White Paper on Governance, the 
European space (or polity), and chiefly the European Commission, Parliament, and 
ancillary agencies, became much more accommodating to civil society 
associations, NGOs, lobbyists, and in particular minority groups. The White Paper 
sought to ameliorate many of the problems, both real and perceived, that were 
contributing to the Union‘s democratic deficit. In this instance ―deficit‖ refers to 
the apparent gulf between decision-makers in Brussels and the European citizenry, 
and a corollary of this, the absence of input legitimacy in the development of 
Union law. To make the Union more relevant, accountable and connected to 
Europeans, governance was proposed and subsequently incorporated into the 
European Constitutional Treaty and the Treaty of Lisbon, with the latter taking 
effect 1 December 2009.  
 
Governance is a much more inclusive decision-making model than government as 
it includes both traditional political institutions and actors, e.g. legislatures and 
political parties, and third sector organizations, social movements, and 
supranational bodies in policy making. It reflects the reality of Europe‘s multi-
level programme with its emphasis on consensus, non- zero-sum bargaining and 
shared goals. As Walzenbach (2006) argues, ―European governance has become 
the most appropriate overarching term to capture the complex, dynamic and fast-
changing features of the interdependent institutional ensembles operating as sub-
national, national, and supra-national levels‖ (p.1).  Here, governance has proven a 
cost-effective solution to the Union‘s looming (or existing) legitimation crisis, a 
way of encouraging the development of a participant political culture, improve the 
Union‘s image, and ultimately inject ‗democracy‘ into the decision-making 
process. As stated in 2001, ―The White Paper proposes opening up the policy-
making process to get more people and organizations involved in shaping and 
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 OSCE‘s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights has published several reports 
and ‗action plans‘ summarizing the plight of Roma and proposing short and long-term policy to 
help mitigate some of the institutionally generated prejudices that negatively affect Roma and 
Sinti.  A report entitled, Implementation of the Action Plan on Improving the Situation of Roma 
and Sinti Within the OSCE Area, places emphasis human security, police brutality and 
educational opportunities.   
delivering EU policy. It promotes greater openness, accountability and 
responsibility for all those involved‖ (EU Commission). 
 
European political integration has been hastened by a whole host of considerations 
and developments that have for the most part been dealt with ad hoc. Kohler-Koch 
identifies a very real conundrum:   
 
The transfer of decision-making power to Brussels may take it out of reach 
for local grassroots activists. But European governance may also open 
opportunities for societal groups that so far had been excluded (...) That is to 
say, new opportunity structures may distribute the chances for political 
actors to raise their voice in the decision-making process unevenly (Kohler-
Koch 2005:6) 
 
Institutions therefore have an enabling and/or constraining effect on the actors who 
utilise them. Changes in procedure, either official or unofficial, can dramatically 
change the political opportunities available to a given constituency, interest sector 
or lobby. Equally important are rule changes and/or new regulation, which impact 
intergovernmental relations and accepted practice. Europeanization, in a word, 
encapsulates the European project
13
 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This paper sought to understand how European citizenship and correlated 
institutions and/or norms (i.e. EU directives, programmes and initiatives directed at 
Romani rights and inclusion) affect and/or impact Roma, Romani mobilization and 
minority rights discourse in post-communist Europe, and the EU more generally
14
. 
The goal, two-fold, was to demonstrate that changes at the EU and European level 
enhance political opportunities for minority groups, in this case Roma, and also 
that nationalism and group identity formation can occur simultaneously with or 
after ideational change – whether in the form of judicial decisions, public policy, 
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 Radaelli (2003) provides a useful definition of Europeanization: ―Europeanization consists of 
processes of a) construction, b) diffusion, c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, 
procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‗ways of doing things‘ and shared beliefs and norms….‖(in 
Quaglia 2007: 407). This is a particularly illuminating conception of Europeanization because it 
regards institutional change and changes to the normative order as two reinforcing phenomenon. 
Kohler-Kock discusses a similar phenomenon but relates it to governance. For her, ―governance 
has an ideational dimension as well as an organizational one‖ (1999). 
14
 Such programmes as the Decade of Roma Inclusion 2005 – 2010, the European Roma 
Summits, The European Platform for Roma Inclusion,  and the Commission‘s Roma Task Force 
(etc.) are now fully active and seek to redress exclusion, xenophobia and intolerance at all levels. 
EU directives, or a combination thereof. EU citizenship is therefore an extremely 
important development in that it confirms basic human, political, civil and 
European rights, and in so doing presents Europeans an ideational framework 
rooted in intergovernmentalism and supranationalism.    
 
With respect to EU citizenship, some minority groups are discovering socio-
political advantage – but this should not be overstated because national 
governments still have controlling interest in who gains citizenship and how 
citizenship is ultimately exercised. Before 2000 Germany adhered to the notion of 
jus sanguinis, while other states, such as the United Kingdom, have been more 
amenable to the jus soli principle. EU officials cannot therefore conjure up 
citizenship for those without national-state citizenship, no matter what. But the EU 
does work to counteract changes at the member-state level that would otherwise 
jeopardise fundamental human rights, democracy and rule of law. The Copenhagen 
criteria (1993) ensured new EU states would at the very least establish procedural 
democracy and a legal regime capable of reinforcing a more inclusive, participant 
political culture.    
 
This paper did not explore in any great detail potential problems associated with a 
rights discourse driven ostensibly by EU institutions, namely the EP and 
Commission, and NGOs – European or otherwise. Neither did it look at how this 
Romani cultural awakening/nationalism would play out when challenged by right 
wing reactionaries (i.e. Jobbik) and other ethnic nations. And there is something 
slightly paternalistic about what is going on. For a long time Eastern European 
states, particularly during the communist period 1948 – 1989, have been working 
on behalf of Roma, designing programmes and ‗special schools‘ for Roma, 
assisting Roma acquire literacy and numeracy skills, relocating Roma for ‗their‘ 
benefit, and insisting on assimilatory policy. But seldom have Roma directly been 
involved in such policy formulation and implementation. They have historically 
been recipients of social policy rather than initiators – and for new schemes to have 
legitimacy Roma must be involved. However the EU, OSCE, Council of Europe 
and countless NGOs, namely ERRC in Budapest and Human Rights Watch, have 
established a fairly inclusive process that should bring Romani activists into the 
policy formulation process.  
